Case Law Every Veteran Should Know
Court decisions do not just resolve individual disputes — they set binding legal standards that every VA rater and judge must follow. These are the rulings that define your rights, establish what evidence is valid, and determine when the VA has crossed a legal line.
How Case Law Works in Your Favor
When the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) or the Federal Circuit rules in a veteran's case, that ruling becomes binding precedent — the VA must apply it to every similar case going forward. When a VA rater ignores controlling precedent, that is a legal error you can raise in an HLR or BVA appeal.
The way to use case law in an appeal is direct: cite the case, describe what it held, and explain how the VA violated that holding in your case. For example: "In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990), the Court held that when evidence is in approximate balance, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the claimant. The evidence here is clearly in equipoise, yet the rater resolved the doubt against the veteran without explanation. This constitutes legal error requiring reversal."
Case-by-Case Deep Dives
Some of these decisions get a full plain-English article of their own, with worked examples and copy-and-edit templates. Start with Jandreau v. Nicholson and lay evidence, or browse all articles.
Two Courts That Matter Most
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) hears appeals from BVA decisions and is the primary court shaping VA law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals from CAVC and sets binding precedent for the entire system. Federal Circuit decisions carry the most weight. Both courts' decisions are searchable for free at the links provided below each case.
Benefit of the Doubt & Evidence Standards
Gilbert v. Derwinski (1990): Benefit of the Doubt — Close Calls Go to the Veteran
What it held: Established the "benefit of the doubt" standard in VA law, now found in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) and 38 CFR § 3.102. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence — a roughly equal chance the claim is valid — the VA must resolve the doubt in the veteran's favor. The veteran does not bear the burden of proving a claim by a preponderance; they need only bring the evidence to an approximate balance. Under Lynch v. McDonough, that includes exact equipoise but is not limited to it — the claim is denied only when the evidence persuasively favors one side against the veteran.
Why it matters: This is the most cited case in VA law. Every appeal involving contested evidence should reference Gilbert. When a rater denies a claim without explaining why the evidence favored denial over the veteran, Gilbert is violated.
See it applied: How the benefit of the doubt applies to C&P nexus opinions →
Read Full Decision →Lynch v. McDonough (2021): “Approximate Balance” Does Not Mean a Perfect Tie
What it held: Under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) and 38 CFR § 3.102, the veteran gets the benefit of the doubt whenever the positive and negative evidence is in approximate balance — nearly equal — which includes, but is not limited to, exact equipoise. The rule does not apply when the evidence persuasively favors one side. The court affirmed the denial in Lynch’s own case because the evidence was not in approximate balance.
Why it matters: VA cannot deny a close claim just because the evidence is not a perfect 50/50 split. If the evidence for and against is nearly even, the tie goes to you. This refines the standard first set out in Gilbert v. Derwinski; Bufkin v. Collins later held that whether the evidence is in approximate balance is mainly a factual call the courts review only for clear error, so make the argument at VA and the Board.
See it applied: Citing the benefit of the doubt in a sleep apnea claim →
Find Case →Jandreau v. Nicholson (2007): Your Own Statement Is Competent Evidence of Symptoms You Can Observe
What it held: The VA cannot categorically reject lay evidence just because the veteran is not a medical professional. Lay evidence can be competent to establish a diagnosis when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the condition (the court's example: a broken leg; ringing in the ears is another, see Charles v. Principi), (2) the layperson is reporting a diagnosis a medical professional gave at the time, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Whether lay evidence is competent in a given case is a factual question for the Board.
Why it matters: The VA often dismisses personal statements as "lay evidence" without probative value. Jandreau establishes that this is wrong — a veteran's statement about what they experience is legally competent evidence. Cite this when the VA ignores or minimizes your personal statement or buddy statements.
Full Breakdown → Can Lay Evidence Prove a VA Disability Claim? — the three Jandreau situations, competent vs. credible, the lay/medical line, and copy-and-edit statement templates.
See it applied: When your own statement can satisfy the current-diagnosis element →
Read Full Decision →Davidson v. Shinseki (2009): Lay Evidence Cannot Be Rejected Across the Board
What it held: The Veterans Court erred by stating categorically that a medical opinion was required to establish nexus and that a layperson could never be competent on that question. Under 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a), VA must consider all pertinent lay and medical evidence. Applying Jandreau, the Federal Circuit held that lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis or a nexus: whether it is depends on the facts of the case and the condition involved.
Why it matters: VA cannot throw out your statement, or a family member’s, just because the person is not a doctor. It must decide whether the lay evidence is competent for that particular condition and then weigh it. Davidson does not mean lay evidence will win on a medically complex question — the link for most conditions still generally needs a qualified medical opinion — but a decision that rejects lay evidence as a blanket rule is legal error.
See it applied: When lay evidence can speak to the medical link →
Find Case →Buchanan v. Nicholson (2006): Missing Service Records Cannot Defeat Credible Lay Testimony
What it held: The Board cannot find a veteran's lay testimony not credible solely because there is no contemporaneous medical documentation to back it up. Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient on its own, and the lack of records is only one factor the Board may weigh when deciding credibility — it cannot be the sole reason for rejecting the testimony.
Why it matters: Many veterans never sought treatment in service or for years afterward, and some have records that were lost (for example in the 1973 NPRC fire). When a denial says your statement is not credible simply because “there is no record of treatment,” Buchanan establishes that this alone is not a valid reason — the VA must actually assess whether your testimony is credible.
See it applied: Using lay testimony when your service records are missing → · Buchanan and missing records →
Read Full Decision →Our Breakdown →Barr v. Nicholson (2007): Observable Conditions Need No Doctor — and Any VA Exam Must Be Adequate
What it held: A veteran is competent to testify about a condition that is observable to a layperson — in this case, varicose veins, which can be seen and felt without medical training. Lay testimony is competent to establish the presence of an observable condition and continuity of symptoms since service, and the Board cannot reject it solely because it comes from a layperson. The court also held that once the VA undertakes to provide a medical examination, it must provide an adequate one, even if it was not strictly required to order the exam.
Why it matters: Two tools in one case. Cite Barr when the VA dismisses your account of a condition you can see or feel on the grounds that only a doctor can identify it, and cite it when a C&P exam or DBQ is incomplete or poorly reasoned — an inadequate exam cannot be the basis for a denial.
See it applied: Challenging an inadequate DBQ → · Challenging an inadequate C&P exam → · Challenging an inadequate PACT Act exam →
Find Case →Wise v. Shinseki (2014): Unsettled Science Is Not a Reason to Deny a Claim
What it held: The VA cannot require a veteran to prove a claim to the level of scientific certainty. The benefit-of-the-doubt rule still applies even when the underlying medical or scientific question is unsettled. The standard is an approximate balance of the evidence — not conclusive medical proof — and the VA may not deny a claim simply because the science is not definitive.
Why it matters: Especially powerful for toxic exposure claims, sleep apnea claims, and secondary conditions where the medical literature is still developing. When the VA denies because a link is "not medically established," Wise establishes that unsettled science does not defeat a claim that is otherwise in equipoise — the benefit of the doubt must still be applied.
See it applied: Benefit of the doubt when the medical opinion is not certain →
Read Full Decision →Bufkin v. Collins (2025): How Courts Review the Benefit-of-the-Doubt Call
What it held: The VA’s determination of whether the evidence is in “approximate balance” under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is a predominantly factual question. The CAVC reviews that determination for clear error rather than deciding it fresh.
Why it matters: Because the CAVC defers to the VA’s weighing of the evidence, the best place to win a benefit-of-the-doubt argument is at the VA and the Board — build a strong record and argue equipoise explicitly before the case ever reaches court. Supreme Court decisions bind both the CAVC and the Federal Circuit.
See it applied: Arguing “at least as likely as not” and equipoise at the VA → · Benefit of the doubt for lay evidence →
Find Case →Stefl v. Nicholson (2007): A Medical Opinion Must Explain Its Reasoning
What it held: A medical examination is adequate only when it considers the veteran’s prior medical history, describes the disability in enough detail for the Board’s evaluation to be fully informed, and supports its conclusion with an analysis the Board can weigh. An opinion that addresses direct causation but ignores aggravation does not answer the full question.
Why it matters: A bare “less likely than not” with no reasoning is not enough to deny a claim. When an examiner skips the rationale or ignores the secondary/aggravation question, cite Stefl to argue the exam is inadequate and must be redone.
See it applied: What makes a nexus opinion adequate on a PACT Act secondary claim → · Challenging an inadequate C&P exam →
Find Case →Snuffer v. Gober (1997): Reported Worsening Requires a New Exam
What it held: When a veteran reports that a service-connected condition has worsened since the last VA examination, the VA’s duty to assist (38 CFR § 3.159) can require a new, contemporaneous examination. In Snuffer, the veteran’s assertion of worsening about two years after his last exam entitled him to a new one.
Why it matters: If your rating is based on an old exam and your condition has gotten worse, say so specifically. Cite Snuffer to argue the VA cannot rate you on stale findings after you have reported worsening.
See it applied: When a report of worsening calls for a new C&P exam →
Find Case →Palczewski v. Nicholson (2007): Passage of Time Alone Does Not Require a New Exam
What it held: The mere passage of time since the last examination does not, by itself, make that exam inadequate or require a new one. The question is whether there is evidence of a change in the condition or an allegation of worsening.
Why it matters: The counterweight to Snuffer. When requesting a new exam, do not rely on the exam simply being old — point to specific evidence or statements that your condition has changed.
See it applied: Why the passage of time alone does not require a new exam →
Find Case →Service Connection & Nexus
Caluza v. Brown (1995): The Three Elements Every Service Connection Claim Must Prove
What it held: Set out the three elements required for service connection: (1) a current diagnosis of the claimed condition, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury, and (3) a nexus between the current condition and the in-service event. All three must be present. The absence of any one element is a valid basis for denial. The Federal Circuit restated the same three elements in Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Why it matters: The foundational framework for every service connection claim. Knowing which element is missing from your denial tells you exactly what evidence to develop. If the rater denied for lack of nexus, get a nexus letter. If they denied for lack of in-service event, build that evidence.
See it applied: The three elements of the Caluza Triangle explained →
Read Full Decision →Shedden v. Principi (2004): The Federal Circuit’s Three Elements of Service Connection
What it held: To establish service connection, a veteran must show (1) a present disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury, and (3) a causal relationship, or nexus, between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated in service.
Why it matters: This is the Federal Circuit’s statement of the same three elements the CAVC set out in Caluza, and because it comes from the higher court, it is the version many Board decisions quote. Use it to frame any direct claim under 38 CFR § 3.303: identify which of the three elements the VA said was missing and aim your new evidence there.
See it applied: The three elements of the Caluza Triangle explained →
VA manual: M21-1 V.ii.2.A →
Find Case →Walker v. Shinseki (2013): Continuity of Symptoms Works Only for Listed Chronic Diseases
What it held: The continuity-of-symptomatology route to service connection in 38 CFR § 3.303(b) is available only for the chronic diseases listed in 38 CFR § 3.309(a). The court abrogated earlier Veterans Court decisions that had applied it to conditions not on that list. Because hearing loss was not on the list, the veteran could not use this route for his hearing loss claim.
Why it matters: If your condition is on the § 3.309(a) list (arthritis, hypertension, organic diseases of the nervous system and others), proof that symptoms continued from service to today can establish service connection. If it is not on the list, continuous symptoms are still useful evidence, but they cannot stand in for the nexus element on their own — you generally need a medical opinion linking the condition to service.
See it applied: When continuity of symptoms can prove service connection →
Find Case →McLendon v. Nicholson (2006): When the VA Is Required to Order a C&P Exam
What it held: Established a low threshold for when the VA is required to provide a C&P exam. Under 38 CFR § 3.159(c)(4), the VA must order an exam when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, (2) evidence of an in-service event, injury, or disease, (3) an indication that the disability or symptoms may be associated with service, and (4) not enough competent medical evidence in the file to decide the claim. The third element is a “low threshold” — a significantly lower bar than proving service connection.
Why it matters: The VA frequently denies claims without ordering an exam. McLendon establishes that once even minimal evidence points toward service connection, an exam is required — and failure to provide one is a violation of the duty to assist that can reverse a denial.
See it applied: When the VA must order an exam on a secondary claim → · When lay evidence triggers an exam →
Find Case →Clemons v. Shinseki (2009): A Claim for One Mental Health Condition Covers Them All
What it held: A claim for one psychiatric condition encompasses all psychiatric conditions that could reasonably be encompassed by the evidence and the description of the claim. A veteran who files for PTSD should have their claim considered for depression, anxiety, and any other mental health condition the evidence supports — not just the specific condition named in the filing.
Why it matters: Veterans who filed for one mental health condition and were denied may have had other conditions they qualify for overlooked entirely. Clemons is also used to argue that a claim filed for one musculoskeletal condition should be read broadly to cover all associated conditions.
See it applied: How a claim for one mental health condition covers every diagnosis →
Read Full Decision →Saunders v. Wilkie (2018): Pain Alone Can Be a Ratable Disability Without a Diagnosis
What it held: Pain alone — even without an underlying diagnosis — can constitute a disability for VA compensation purposes under 38 U.S.C. § 1110. The Federal Circuit rejected the VA's longstanding position that a diagnosable condition was always required. Pain counts as a disability when it reaches the level of a functional impairment of earning capacity.
Why it matters: Groundbreaking for veterans with chronic pain conditions that do not fit neatly into a diagnostic code. If you have documented, debilitating pain without a clearly diagnosable underlying cause, Saunders provides the legal basis to argue for a disability rating based on that pain alone. Saunders only settles the current-disability element: you still need an in-service event and a nexus, and the pain must actually impair function (see Mitchell).
See it applied: Proving the current-disability element →
Read Full Decision →Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake (2008): A Medical Opinion Is Only as Strong as the Reasoning Behind It
What it held: A medical opinion is only as persuasive as the reasoning behind it. The probative value of an opinion comes not from the credentials of the author or the size of the record reviewed, but from whether the opinion is supported by a clear, reasoned analysis connecting the facts to the conclusion. A short, well-explained private opinion can outweigh a conclusory VA examiner's opinion that simply states a result without explaining why.
Why it matters: This is one of the most important nexus-opinion cases in VA law. It explains why a detailed, well-reasoned nexus letter can defeat a bare VA examiner's opinion — and why some nexus letters are powerful while others carry almost no weight. When the VA favors its examiner solely because they "reviewed the C-file," Nieves-Rodriguez shows that reasoning, not record access, is what counts.
See it applied: Citing medical research in a PTSD nexus letter → · What makes a medical opinion adequate →
Read Full Decision →Miller v. Wilkie (2020): An Examiner Who Ignores Your Lay Statements Produces an Inadequate Opinion
What it held: When a medical examiner fails to address a veteran's competent lay statements — such as an account of continuous symptoms since service — the resulting opinion may be inadequate. An examiner cannot simply ignore relevant lay evidence; the opinion must account for it, and an opinion that overlooks it cannot be the sole basis for a denial.
Why it matters: Gold for sleep apnea, tinnitus, secondary, and continuity-of-symptomatology claims, where the veteran's own account of when symptoms began is central. If a C&P examiner's opinion never mentions or grapples with your lay statements, Miller supports an argument that the opinion is inadequate and cannot support the denial.
See it applied: Why an examiner must address your lay statements →
Read Full Decision →Our Breakdown →Gabrielson v. Brown (1994): The VA Must Explain Why It Credited One Opinion Over Another
What it held: When there is conflicting medical evidence, the VA must provide an adequate statement of reasons explaining why it favored one opinion over another. It is not enough to simply pick a side; the adjudicator must explain the basis for crediting one opinion and discounting the competing one, so that the veteran and a reviewing court can understand the rationale.
Why it matters: A strong appeal case whenever the VA had favorable evidence in front of it — a private nexus opinion, a treating physician's statement — and denied without explaining why it preferred the VA examiner. When the decision does not explain how the conflicting evidence was weighed, Gabrielson establishes that the decision is legally deficient.
See it applied: What makes one medical opinion more persuasive than another →
Find Case →Allen v. Brown (1995): Aggravation of a Non-Service-Connected Condition Is Compensable
What it held: A veteran is entitled to compensation when a service-connected disability aggravates a non-service-connected condition — and compensation is paid for the degree of aggravation, measured against the condition's baseline level before the aggravation occurred. The court established that aggravation, not just direct causation, is a compensable pathway.
Why it matters: Allen is the foundational aggravation case behind modern secondary service connection law, later codified into 38 CFR § 3.310. If the VA only analyzes whether your service-connected condition caused a new condition — and ignores whether it worsened a condition you already had — Allen establishes that the aggravation theory must also be considered.
See it applied: How Allen and § 3.310 apply after a PACT Act grant →
Read Full Decision →Allen v. Principi (2001): Substance Abuse Caused by a Service-Connected Condition Can Be Compensated
What it held: 38 U.S.C. § 1110 bars compensation for primary alcohol or drug abuse and for disabilities that result from primary abuse. It does not bar compensation for an alcohol or drug abuse disability that arises secondarily from a service-connected disability, or the use of that abuse as evidence of how severe the service-connected disability is. The veteran must show the substance abuse was caused by the service-connected condition.
Why it matters: Many veterans with PTSD or chronic pain use alcohol or drugs to cope. If the substance use disorder is secondary to a service-connected condition, it can be compensated — for PTSD, usually as part of the single mental health rating — and conditions it causes, such as alcohol-related liver disease, can be service-connected through the secondary chain under 38 CFR § 3.310. Do not confuse this case with Allen v. Brown (1995), the aggravation case.
See it applied: Substance use disorder secondary to PTSD →
Find Case →Ward v. Wilkie (2019): Secondary Aggravation Does Not Have to Be Permanent
What it held: The "permanent worsening" standard used for in-service aggravation of a pre-existing condition does not apply to secondary aggravation under 38 CFR § 3.310(b). Any increase in severity of a non-service-connected condition that results from a service-connected disability is aggravation — regardless of whether it is permanent.
Why it matters: Examiners still write that a condition was "not permanently aggravated." Under Ward, that opinion applies the wrong legal standard and is inadequate. VA proposed a rule in 2020 to reverse Ward, but it was never finalized, and VA's M21-1 states that permanent worsening is not required. Do not confuse this with § 3.306 (a condition that pre-dated service and worsened during service), where temporary flare-ups generally are not enough.
See it applied: Secondary aggravation without permanence → · Ward in the secondary guide → · Aggravation in PACT Act secondary claims →
Read Full Decision →Spicer v. McDonough (2023): "But-For" Causation Covers Any Additional Disability
What it held: Under 38 U.S.C. § 1110, compensation covers any additional disability that would not exist but for a service-connected disability — whether the service-connected condition caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to it, including by preventing or interfering with treatment of another condition.
Why it matters: VA's M21-1 (V.ii.2.D) now follows Spicer: raters apply the broader but-for standard and no longer deduct "natural progress" in secondary-aggravation claims, even though § 3.310(b)'s text still mentions it. The baseline requirement still applies. If a denial reasons that the worsening was "natural progression," or ignores how a service-connected condition blocked treatment, Spicer is the answer.
See it applied: Spicer in the secondary guide →
VA manual: M21-1 V.ii.2.D →
Find Case →Walsh v. Wilkie (2020): Obesity Can Be the Link in a Secondary Claim
What it held: Obesity is not itself a disability that can be compensated, but it can be an “intermediate step” between a service-connected disability and a condition claimed on a secondary basis, as VA General Counsel Precedent Opinion VAOPGCPREC 1-2017 explains. The Court held that VA must consider whether the service-connected disability caused or aggravated the obesity — not just caused it — consistent with 38 CFR § 3.310. The other questions are whether the obesity was a substantial factor in causing the claimed condition and whether that condition would not have occurred but for the obesity.
Why it matters: If a service-connected knee or back limits your activity, or medication for a service-connected condition caused weight gain, conditions linked to that weight gain — such as sleep apnea or hypertension — may be service-connected through the chain. A nexus opinion should address each link. As with any aggravation theory, see Ward v. Wilkie.
See it applied: Intermediary conditions and the obesity chain →
Find Case →McClain v. Nicholson (2007): A Disability Present at Any Point During the Claim Counts
What it held: The current-disability requirement is satisfied when the veteran has the disability at the time the claim is filed or at any point while the claim is pending, even if the condition later resolves before the VA decides the claim.
Why it matters: Supports the “current diagnosis” element of the Caluza Triangle for conditions that flare and remit. The VA cannot deny simply because the condition was quiet at the moment of the decision if it was documented during the claim period.
See it applied: Proving a current diagnosis for conditions that come and go →
Find Case →Romanowsky v. Shinseki (2013): A Diagnosis Shortly Before You Filed Still Counts
What it held: When the record contains a recent diagnosis made before the veteran filed the claim, the Board must consider it in deciding whether a current disability exists, even if a later exam does not find the condition. The case extends McClain, which held that a disability present at any time during the claim counts.
Why it matters: If your condition was diagnosed shortly before you filed but was quiet at the C&P exam, the VA cannot simply ignore the earlier diagnosis. Point the rater to it as evidence of the current-disability element under 38 CFR § 3.303.
See it applied: Proving a current diagnosis for conditions that come and go →
Find Case →Charles v. Principi (2002): You Are Competent to Say Your Ears Ring
What it held: Ringing in the ears is a condition a layperson can observe, so a veteran is competent to testify that he or she has tinnitus. The Court also held that, with the veteran’s competent account of tinnitus and evidence of in-service noise, the VA’s duty to assist required a medical exam and opinion on whether the tinnitus is related to service.
Why it matters: Tinnitus is the classic example of a condition you can identify yourself, one of the situations later described in Jandreau. If a denial says only a doctor can diagnose your tinnitus, or the VA decided the claim without an exam, cite Charles. Note that hearing loss is different: it must meet the test thresholds in 38 CFR § 3.385.
See it applied: Hearing loss and tinnitus DBQs → · When lay evidence can prove a diagnosis →
VA manual: M21-1 V.iii.2.B →
Find Case →Wallin v. West (1998): The Elements of a Secondary Service Connection Claim
What it held: To establish secondary service connection, a veteran needs evidence of (1) a current disability, (2) a service-connected disability, and (3) medical nexus evidence connecting the two.
Why it matters: The secondary-claim counterpart to Caluza. If a secondary claim is denied, identify which of the three Wallin elements the VA said was missing and target your new evidence there.
See it applied: The evidence needed for a secondary service connection nexus →
Find Case →El-Amin v. Shinseki (2013): Examiners Must Address Aggravation, Not Just Causation
What it held: A medical opinion that addresses only whether a service-connected condition caused a secondary condition, without addressing whether it aggravated that condition, is inadequate for deciding a secondary service connection claim.
Why it matters: A common C&P error on secondary claims is answering only the causation question. Cite El-Amin to require an opinion on aggravation under 38 CFR § 3.310(b).
See it applied: Proving the causal link in a secondary claim →
Find Case →Patton v. West (1999): Personal Assault and MST Claims Get Special Evidence Rules
What it held: In personal-assault PTSD claims, including MST, the VA must apply the special evidentiary procedures for these claims, now in 38 CFR § 3.304(f)(5). Evidence from sources other than service records — and behavior changes after the event — can corroborate the stressor, even when the assault was never reported during service.
Why it matters: Many MST survivors never filed a report. Patton makes clear that the absence of an in-service report does not defeat the claim; markers such as performance changes, requests for transfer, or treatment records can establish the stressor.
See it applied: Behavioral markers as evidence in MST claims →
Find Case →Menegassi v. Shinseki (2011): A Medical Opinion Can Help Corroborate an MST Stressor
What it held: Under 38 CFR § 3.304(f)(5), medical opinion evidence may be submitted and used in deciding whether the occurrence of an in-service personal-assault stressor is corroborated. The regulation lets veterans claiming PTSD from an in-service assault rely on evidence other than service records, and that includes a medical or mental health professional’s opinion.
Why it matters: Building on Patton v. West, Menegassi means a mental health professional’s opinion that your behavioral markers are consistent with an assault is evidence VA must weigh along with everything else in the file, even if the opinion was written years after service. It does not automatically prove the stressor, but VA cannot ignore it.
See it applied: Marker evidence and medical opinions in MST claims →
Find Case →Rating & Functional Loss Case Law
DeLuca v. Brown (1995): Pain and Functional Loss Must Be Factored Into a Rating
What it held: The VA must consider functional loss due to pain when rating musculoskeletal disabilities. Range of motion alone is insufficient — if a veteran experiences pain that limits function, the rating must reflect that limitation even if the measured range of motion would otherwise support a lower rating. The court required raters to consider 38 CFR §§ 4.40 and 4.45 together, and required examiners to describe any additional loss of motion from pain on use or during flare-ups. Later cases sharpened the rule: Mitchell (pain must actually limit function), Correia (the required range-of-motion tests) and Sharp (flare-up estimates).
Why it matters: DeLuca is cited in virtually every musculoskeletal appeal involving back, knee, shoulder, or hip conditions. If your C&P exam only measured range of motion and didn't ask about pain during motion, pain after motion, or functional limitations, the exam likely violated DeLuca and supports a request for a new exam or higher rating.
See it applied: What musculoskeletal DBQs must cover on functional loss →
Read Full Decision →Mitchell v. Shinseki (2011): Pain Must Actually Limit Function — and Examiners Must Address Flare-Ups
What it held: Pain alone, throughout a range of motion, does not by itself count as functional loss under 38 CFR §§ 4.40 and 4.45. Pain has to affect some aspect of the normal working movements of the body, such as excursion, strength, speed, coordination or endurance, before it supports a higher rating. The Court also held that an exam that does not address the additional loss of motion during flare-ups or after repeated use, as DeLuca requires, is inadequate.
Why it matters: When you describe pain at your exam, connect it to what it stops you from doing: how far you can bend, how long you can stand, what happens after repeated movement or during a flare. Mitchell is why that description matters, and why an exam that ignores flare-ups can be challenged. Sharp later built on this.
See it applied: What musculoskeletal DBQs must cover on functional loss → · Range-of-motion testing at the exam →
VA manual: M21-1 V.iii.1.A →
Find Case →Burton v. Shinseki (2011): The Painful-Motion Rule Is Not Limited to Arthritis
What it held: 38 CFR § 4.59, which recognizes painful motion as entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating for the joint, is not limited to arthritis. The Board must consider it whenever a claimant raises it or the record reasonably shows painful motion, whatever the underlying joint condition.
Why it matters: A rater cannot refuse the painful-motion minimum just because your X-rays do not show arthritis. If your joint is painful on motion from a strain, an old injury or another condition, Burton says § 4.59 still applies.
See it applied: Range-of-motion and painful-motion testing on joint DBQs → · Range-of-motion testing at the exam →
VA manual: M21-1 V.iii.1.A →
Find Case →Petitti v. McDonald (2015): Painful Motion Earns the Minimum Rating — No X-Ray Required
What it held: Read together with the applicable diagnostic code, 38 CFR § 4.59 entitles a veteran to the minimum compensable rating for each joint with painful motion, even when there is no actual limitation of motion and no X-ray evidence of arthritis. Objective medical evidence of pain is not required; credible lay evidence of painful motion can be enough.
Why it matters: Each painful joint can carry its own 10 percent (or the minimum for that joint’s code). Section 4.59 is not a stand-alone rating, though — it works through the diagnostic code that applies to the joint. If the VA assigned 0 percent to a joint you have consistently reported as painful on movement, cite Petitti with Burton.
See it applied: What a complete joint DBQ must record → · Range-of-motion testing at the exam →
VA manual: M21-1 V.iii.1.A →
Find Case →Correia v. McDonald (2016): Joint Exams Must Test Active, Passive, Weight-Bearing and Non-Weight-Bearing Motion
What it held: Interpreting 38 CFR § 4.59, the court held that a joint examination is incomplete unless range of motion is tested and recorded in active motion, passive motion, weight-bearing and non-weight-bearing — and, where the other joint is undamaged, compared against the opposite joint. If any of those measurements can be taken and is missing, the exam does not comply with the regulation.
Why it matters: Pull up the range-of-motion section of your C&P exam or DBQ and look for all four sets of measurements. If the examiner recorded active motion only, skipped passive motion, or never noted whether testing was done weight-bearing, the exam is arguably inadequate under Correia — grounds for requesting a new, compliant exam through a Supplemental Claim or Higher-Level Review. Where a measurement genuinely cannot be taken, the examiner must say so and explain why. Correia governs the testing itself; DeLuca governs how pain and functional loss are then applied to the rating.
See it applied: Range-of-motion testing required on joint DBQs →
Find Case →Stegall v. West (1998): The VA Must Comply With Board Remand Instructions
What it held: When the BVA remands a case with specific instructions — obtain an exam, get certain records, make a specific finding — the VA is legally required to comply with those instructions. A subsequent decision that fails to comply with the remand instructions is itself legal error that must be addressed before the BVA can decide the claim.
Why it matters: Veterans who have had BVA remands should carefully compare the remand instructions to what the Regional Office actually did. When the RO fails to follow a remand — a common occurrence — Stegall provides the legal basis to argue the decision below is defective before the BVA even reaches the merits.
See it applied: How Board remands work under the Appeals Modernization Act → · Remands at the Board →
Find Case →Dingess v. Nicholson (2006): VA Notice Must Explain Rating Criteria and Effective Dates
What it held: The VA's notification requirements under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) require the VA to tell veterans not just what evidence is needed, but also what the rating criteria are, how effective dates are established, and what evidence is relevant to those determinations. A notice that tells a veteran what to submit but not how ratings or effective dates work is legally deficient.
Why it matters: When veterans are underpaid due to an incorrect effective date or an incorrect rating level, a Dingess argument establishes that the VA's own notice failure contributed to the error. This is particularly relevant for effective date arguments where earlier filing would have been made had proper notice been given.
See it applied: When a notice error can be fixed on Board remand →
Find Case →Sharp v. Shulkin (2017): Examiners Must Estimate Flare-Up Limitations
What it held: When a veteran reports flare-ups, the examiner must estimate the additional functional loss during flare-ups based on all available information, including the veteran’s own description. The examiner cannot refuse to estimate simply because the exam was not conducted during a flare-up.
Why it matters: A musculoskeletal DBQ that says “unable to say without resorting to speculation” without explaining why is inadequate. Describe your flare-ups in detail and cite Sharp if the examiner fails to address them.
See it applied: Flare-up estimates on musculoskeletal DBQs →
Find Case →Pierce v. Principi (2004): A 50% Migraine Rating Does Not Require Being Unable to Work
What it held: The 50% level for migraines under Diagnostic Code 8100 (38 CFR § 4.124a) calls for attacks “productive of severe economic inadaptability.” The Court held that “productive of” can mean either producing or capable of producing that result, so the rating does not require that the veteran be completely unable to work.
Why it matters: A denial of 50% because you still hold a job misreads the rule. Show the economic impact of your attacks: missed days, leaving early, lost productivity, and leave used for headaches. A headache log paired with employer or leave records makes that case.
See it applied: Migraine rating levels and what the exam must show →
Find Case →Martinak v. Nicholson (2007): The Hearing Exam Must Describe How Hearing Loss Affects You
What it held: In addition to recording objective test results, a VA audiologist must fully describe the functional effects of a hearing disability in the final report. The schedular rating is a mechanical application of the test scores, but whether an extra-schedular rating is warranted under 38 CFR § 3.321(b) is not decided by test results alone. The Court also upheld testing in a sound-controlled room.
Why it matters: Hearing loss ratings come straight from the numbers under the hearing-loss rules in 38 CFR § 3.385 and the rating tables, so the functional description is where your real-world limits get on the record. If the report never mentions how your hearing affects conversations, phone use, or work, you can point to Martinak to argue the exam is incomplete. You must still show the missing description actually hurt your claim.
See it applied: What the hearing exam must document →
Find Case →Mauerhan v. Principi (2002): Mental Health Symptom Lists Are Examples, Not a Checklist
What it held: The symptoms listed in the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders (38 CFR § 4.130) are examples of the type and degree of symptoms for each level, not an exhaustive or mandatory checklist. The VA must consider all symptoms affecting occupational and social impairment.
Why it matters: A veteran does not need every listed symptom to qualify for a rating level. If a rater denies a higher rating because a specific listed symptom is absent, cite Mauerhan.
See it applied: Why the symptom lists in the rating criteria are examples →
Find Case →Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki (2013): Mental Health Ratings Turn on Symptom-Driven Impairment
What it held: A mental health rating under 38 CFR § 4.130 is primarily symptom-driven: the VA looks at the frequency, severity, and duration of the symptoms and whether they cause the level of occupational and social impairment described for that rating.
Why it matters: Pairs with Mauerhan. Frame your evidence around how often your symptoms occur, how severe they are, and how they affect work and relationships — not just which symptoms appear on the list.
See it applied: How symptoms and their impact drive a mental health rating →
Find Case →Bankhead v. Shulkin (2017): Suicidal Ideation Alone Can Support a 70% Rating
What it held: The presence of suicidal ideation, a symptom listed at the 70% level, may alone cause occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas. The Board erred by requiring more — such as a plan, intent, or hospitalization — before crediting the symptom.
Why it matters: Passive suicidal ideation counts and must be addressed. If a rating decision dismisses it because there was no plan or attempt, cite Bankhead. If you are in crisis, dial 988 then press 1.
See it applied: How suicidal ideation is weighed at the 70% level →
Find Case →Mittleider v. West (1998): Symptoms That Cannot Be Separated Go to the Veteran
What it held: When it is not possible to separate the effects of a service-connected condition from those of a non-service-connected condition, the VA must attribute all of the signs and symptoms to the service-connected condition.
Why it matters: Common in mental health and overlapping physical conditions. If an examiner cannot say which condition causes which symptoms, the rating should reflect all of them.
See it applied: When overlapping symptoms cannot be separated →
Find Case →Esteban v. Brown (1994): Separate Symptoms Get Separate Ratings
What it held: Separate disability ratings can be assigned for different manifestations of the same injury, as long as none of the symptoms of one condition duplicates or overlaps the symptoms of another. In Esteban, a facial injury supported separate ratings for disfigurement, a painful scar, and facial muscle damage. That is not pyramiding under 38 CFR § 4.14.
Why it matters: Pyramiding bars rating the same symptom twice. It does not bar separate ratings for different symptoms. When the VA folds distinct problems into a single rating, such as a back condition and the radiculopathy it causes in a leg, Esteban supports separate ratings for each.
See it applied: Where pyramiding stops and separate ratings begin →
Deep dive: Painful-scar ratings: when one scar can carry separate ratings under DCs 7800–7805 →
VA manual: M21-1 V.ii.3.D →
Find Case →Hart v. Mansfield (2007): Staged Ratings in Increased-Rating Claims
What it held: In a claim for an increased rating, the VA must consider whether the disability has been more severe at some times than others during the appeal period, and assign different (“staged”) ratings for different periods when the facts support it. The relevant period starts one year before the claim was filed, because an increase shown in that year can be paid from the date it happened (38 CFR § 3.400(o)(2)). Staged ratings for initial ratings were already required by Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999).
Why it matters: If your condition got worse partway through a long appeal, you should not be stuck with one rating for the whole period. Ask for a higher rating from the date the evidence first shows the worsening, and point to the year before your claim as well.
Read: Appeals Guide — protecting your effective date →
VA manual: M21-1 V.ii.4.A →
Find Case →Thun v. Peake (2008): The Test for an Extra-Schedular Rating
What it held: Set out the steps for an extra-schedular rating under 38 CFR § 3.321(b)(1). First, the rating criteria must not reasonably describe the level of disability and symptoms. Second, the disability picture must show related factors such as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization. If both are met, the claim must be referred to the Under Secretary for Benefits or the Director of Compensation Service to decide whether an extra-schedular rating is warranted.
Why it matters: Raters and the Board cannot assign an extra-schedular rating themselves, but they must refer the claim when the first two steps are met. If your disability causes problems the rating criteria do not account for at all, argue each step of Thun. Since a 2018 amendment to § 3.321(b)(1), this route applies to individual disabilities, not their combined effect. Extra-schedular TDIU is a separate route under § 4.16(b).
Read: TDIU Guide — schedular and extra-schedular TDIU →
VA manual: M21-1 V.ii.3.D →
Find Case →Rice v. Shinseki (2009): TDIU Is Part of Your Rating Claim, Not a Separate One
What it held: A request for TDIU is not a separate claim for benefits. It is part of the claim for an initial rating or an increased rating when the veteran expressly asks for it or the record reasonably raises unemployability due to the disability being rated.
Why it matters: If the evidence in your rating claim shows you cannot work because of your service-connected conditions, the VA must consider TDIU even if you never filed VA Form 21-8940, and the TDIU effective date can follow the underlying rating claim. Look for evidence of unemployability the VA overlooked. TDIU itself is governed by 38 CFR § 4.16 and § 3.341.
See it applied: Raising TDIU within your rating claim → · Mental health and TDIU when you cannot work → · PTSD and TDIU →
VA manual: M21-1 VIII.iv.3.A–C →
Find Case →Ray v. Wilkie (2019): What “Substantially Gainful Employment” Means
What it held: Interpreted “unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation” in the TDIU regulation. The phrase has an economic side, meaning work that pays more than marginal income, and a non-economic side, meaning the veteran’s ability, given his or her history, education, skill and training, to do the physical activities (such as standing, sitting, lifting and walking) and mental activities (such as memory, concentration and getting along with others) that work requires.
Why it matters: A TDIU denial cannot rest on a bare statement that you “could do sedentary work.” The VA must explain how your actual education, work history and service-connected limitations allow you to hold a real job that pays more than marginal income. Your age and non-service-connected conditions are not part of the test (38 CFR § 3.341).
See it applied: What counts as substantially gainful employment →
VA manual: M21-1 VIII.iv.3.C →
Find Case →Turco v. Brown (1996): Aid and Attendance Needs Only One Factor
What it held: VA must consider the factors listed in 38 CFR § 3.352(a) when deciding whether someone needs regular aid and attendance. Because the regulation says not all of the listed conditions have to be found, the Court held that eligibility requires at least one of the listed factors to be present. The case arose from a claim for special monthly pension, which uses the same § 3.352(a) factors.
Why it matters: You do not need to be unable to dress, feed yourself, and attend to the wants of nature all at once. One factor, such as needing regular help to protect you from the hazards of daily life, can be enough, and the need must be regular, not constant (§ 3.352(a)).
See it applied: Aid & Attendance (SMC-L, R, and T) →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Akles v. Derwinski (1991): VA Must Consider SMC Even If You Never Asked for It
What it held: The veteran asked for a higher rating for an atrophied testicle, a condition the rating schedule rated at 0%. VA denied the claim without an exam and never considered special monthly compensation for loss of use of a creative organ (then 38 U.S.C. § 314(k)). The Court held that a veteran does not have to name the statute or regulation he is claiming under: VA’s duty to assist and its duty to tell veterans about all benefits they may be entitled to meant VA should have inferred a request for SMC from the claim, whether or not the veteran raised it. It also noted that VA’s own M21-1 treated SMC as an “inferred issue.” The case was remanded for an exam and an SMC decision.
Why it matters: SMC is part of the claim whenever the record raises it. If VA rated a condition that points to SMC, such as loss of use of a limb or a creative organ, and never addressed SMC, that is an error you can raise.
See it applied: You do not have to ask for SMC by name →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Bradley v. Peake (2008): TDIU Based on One Disability Can Be the “Total” Rating for SMC-S
What it held: SMC at the housebound rate under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) requires “a service-connected disability rated as total” plus additional disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60%. The Court held that a 100% combined rating built from several disabilities does not meet the first requirement, but that the statute does not limit a disability “rated as total” to a 100% schedular rating: VA’s regulation lets a TDIU rating based on a single disability satisfy it. Because VA must maximize benefits, it should have decided whether the veteran’s PTSD alone warranted TDIU before replacing his TDIU with a 100% combined rating. SMC is awarded when the veteran becomes eligible, without a separate claim, so its effective date follows the evidence.
Why it matters: A combined 100% rating can leave money on the table. If one condition alone keeps you from working and your other conditions add up to 60% or more, TDIU for that one condition can qualify you for SMC-S.
See it applied: SMC-S and TDIU → · TDIU and SMC-S →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Buie v. Shinseki (2011): VA Must Check Every Combination of Disabilities for SMC-S
What it held: A TDIU rating based on more than one disability does not satisfy the “service-connected disability rated as total” requirement of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). But the Court held that VA’s duty to maximize benefits requires it to look at all of the veteran’s service-connected disabilities, without regard to the order in which they were service connected, to see whether any combination qualifies for SMC under § 1114(s). When it does, the SMC effective date is the effective date of the award for the last disability that completes the qualifying combination. The Board decision was vacated and the case remanded.
Why it matters: Being rated 100%, or receiving TDIU for several conditions together, does not end the SMC analysis. Ask VA to check whether one disability is total on its own and the rest independently reach 60%, regardless of which was granted first.
See it applied: SMC-S when you already have a total rating →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Tucker v. West (1998): Loss of Use Turns on Remaining Function, Not Whether Amputation Is Warranted
What it held: Under 38 CFR §§ 3.350(a)(2) and 4.63, loss of use of a foot exists when no effective function remains other than what an amputation stump with a suitable prosthesis would serve equally well, judged on the actual remaining function, such as balance and propulsion. The Board denied SMC because the veteran’s condition did “not warrant amputation.” The Court held that was the wrong question: the inquiry is whether effective function remains, not whether amputation is warranted. The Board also relied on its own medical judgment and gave inadequate reasons. The decision was vacated and remanded.
Why it matters: A denial that says your foot or hand is not bad enough to amputate applies the wrong test. The question is what you can still do with it compared with a prosthesis.
See it applied: Loss of use and SMC-K →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Breniser v. Shinseki (2011): One Loss of Use Cannot Be Counted Twice, but VA Must Consider SMC(p)
What it held: The veteran received SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(l) for loss of use of both feet and needed aid and attendance because of that same loss of use. Because § 1114(o) bars a condition from being considered twice, and the Court deferred to VA’s regulation requiring separate and distinct disabilities, he could not reach the higher (o) rate unless his need for aid and attendance came from a different disability. But the Board erred by not considering § 1114(p), which allows an intermediate or full step up when a veteran’s disabilities exceed the requirements of the current rate, and the list of examples in 38 CFR § 3.350(f) is not exclusive. The Court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. Chief Judge Kasold dissented in part.
Why it matters: When the same disability causes both a loss of use and a need for aid and attendance, the higher SMC(o) rate is off the table, but an intermediate or next-higher rate under SMC(p) is not. Make sure the decision addresses (p).
See it applied: Loss of use and SMC levels → · Aid and attendance criteria (§ 3.352) →
VA manual: M21-1 SMC provisions →
Read the Decision →Kitchens v. Brown (1995): A Reduction That Skips the Rules Is Void
What it held: VA reduced a 100% rating that had been in effect for more than five years without following 38 CFR § 3.344(a) and (b). The Court held that when a rating is reduced without observing the applicable laws and regulations, the reduction is void ab initio and will be set aside as not in accordance with law. It also held the Board had improperly reversed the burden by making the veteran prove he deserved restoration, and ordered the 100% rating restored as of the date of the reduction.
Why it matters: If VA reduced a long-standing rating without the findings § 3.344 requires, the remedy is restoration, not just a new look. VA carries the burden of justifying the reduction.
See it applied: Protecting your rating from reduction → · 38 CFR § 3.344 →
VA manual: M21-1 X.ii.4.A, X.ii.4.B →
Read the Decision →Effective Dates & Finality
Rudd v. Nicholson (2006): No Freestanding Earlier Effective Date Claims
What it held: Once a decision assigning an effective date becomes final, a veteran cannot challenge that date by filing a new, freestanding claim for an earlier effective date. Allowing such claims would undermine the rule of finality. The Court vacated the Board decision that had considered the request on the merits and dismissed the appeal.
Why it matters: Effective-date disagreements need to be raised through timely review while the decision is still open. Once it is final, the request needs a recognized legal basis — such as clear and unmistakable error or newly associated service department records under 38 CFR § 3.156(c).
Deep dive: Rudd v. Nicholson Explained →
See it applied: Why finality controls an earlier-effective-date argument → · The Rudd rule explained →
Find Case →Caffrey v. Brown (1994): A Duty-to-Assist Failure Is Not CUE
What it held: The VA's failure to fulfill its duty to assist — here, not obtaining private medical records the veteran had asked it to get — cannot be the basis for a clear and unmistakable error (CUE) claim. A duty-to-assist breach creates an incomplete record, not an incorrect one. Because CUE is judged only on the record that existed when the decision was made, the veteran cannot show the missing evidence would have manifestly changed the outcome.
Why it matters: Once a decision is final, “the VA should have gotten more evidence” will not reopen the effective date. A CUE motion must point to an undebatable error of fact or law based on the evidence already in the file. Duty-to-assist problems need to be raised while the decision is still open, through a timely Supplemental Claim, Higher-Level Review, or Board appeal.
Deep dive: Caffrey v. Brown: New C&P Exams & Why Duty to Assist Isn’t CUE →
See it applied: Why a duty-to-assist error is different from CUE →
Read Full Decision →Military-Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs (2021): An Intent to File Can Protect a Supplemental Claim
What it held: Veterans organizations challenged VA’s Appeals Modernization Act regulations directly in the Federal Circuit. The court held three provisions invalid. The part of 38 CFR § 3.155 that excluded supplemental claims from the intent-to-file framework was arbitrary and capricious, because VA gave no explanation for reading the nearly identical language of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1) and (a)(3) differently. The bar in § 3.2500(b) on filing a supplemental claim while the same claim is on appeal in federal court contradicted 38 U.S.C. § 5104C. The limit in § 14.636(c)(1)(i) on charging fees for certain supplemental claims contradicted 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). The other challenges were dismissed for lack of standing.
Why it matters: An Intent to File can hold your effective date for a Supplemental Claim, even though the printed text of § 3.155 still says otherwise. If VA refused to apply your Intent to File to a Supplemental Claim, cite this case.
See it applied: Intent to File and Supplemental Claims (§ 3.155) → · Why the M21-1 follows the court, not the printed rule →
Read the Decision →Calhoun v. McDonough (2024): Continuously Pursued Issues Are Not Freestanding Claims
What it held: Under the Appeals Modernization Act, a Supplemental Claim filed within one year of a Board decision keeps the effective-date issue pending and prevents it from becoming final. That issue is continuously pursued, so it is not a barred freestanding claim under Rudd.
Why it matters: Filing the next review option within one year preserves the ability to argue for the original claim date. A Supplemental Claim filed later is generally limited to an effective date no earlier than its own receipt date under 38 CFR § 3.2500(h)(2).
See it applied: Keeping your effective date alive through continuous pursuit →
Find Case →Cook v. Principi (2002): No “Grave Procedural Error” Exception to Finality
What it held: A breach of the duty to assist cannot establish clear and unmistakable error, and there is no separate “grave procedural error” exception that keeps an otherwise final decision open. The only ways to revisit a final decision are those Congress provided, such as CUE and reopening with new and material evidence (now “new and relevant” evidence under the Appeals Modernization Act).
Why it matters: Reinforces Caffrey. Duty-to-assist problems need to be raised while the decision is still open, through a timely review option.
See it applied: Why a duty-to-assist failure cannot establish CUE →
Find Case →Smith v. McDonough (2024): CUE Must Change the Outcome on the Merits
What it held: CUE requires an error that, once corrected, would have manifestly changed the merits outcome of the claim — not merely an error that would have let the claim move forward. In Smith, the Board had wrongly found a 1996 claim “not well grounded,” but that was not CUE because the record at the time did not make it undebatable that service connection would have been granted.
Why it matters: When preparing a CUE motion, show how the correct application of the law to the record at the time would have manifestly changed the result, not just that the VA should have done more.
See it applied: What a CUE motion must show to change the outcome →
Read Opinion →George v. McDonough (2022): A Later-Invalidated Regulation Is Not CUE
What it held: The later invalidation of a VA regulation does not establish clear and unmistakable error in an earlier final decision that applied the regulation as it existed at the time. CUE is judged under the law in effect when the decision was made.
Why it matters: A change in how the law is interpreted generally does not reopen old final decisions through CUE. Look to other routes, such as a Supplemental Claim with new and relevant evidence, for relief going forward.
See it applied: Why a later change in legal interpretation is not CUE →
Read Opinion →Russell v. Principi (1992): The Three-Part Test for Clear and Unmistakable Error
What it held: Upheld the clear and unmistakable error (CUE) rule in 38 CFR § 3.105(a) and set the test: (1) either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator, or the law in effect at the time was incorrectly applied; (2) the error must be undebatable, not a disagreement about how the evidence was weighed; and (3) the error must have manifestly changed the outcome. CUE is judged on the record and the law that existed when the decision was made.
Why it matters: This is the standard every CUE motion is measured against. Arguing that VA should have given more weight to your evidence is not CUE. You need an obvious error of fact or law that, once fixed, would have produced a different result. If CUE is found, the decision is corrected as if it had been right from the start, which can restore an earlier effective date and back pay.
See it applied: Using CUE for an earlier effective date → · Why a duty-to-assist error is different from CUE →
Find Case →Fugo v. Brown (1993): A CUE Claim Must Name the Specific Error
What it held: To raise CUE, a claimant must identify with some specificity what the error was and give persuasive reasons why the result would have been manifestly different without it. Broad allegations such as “failure to follow the regulations” or “failure to give due process,” or a claim that VA improperly weighed the evidence, are not enough.
Why it matters: A CUE request that just says VA got it wrong will fail. Name the decision, the exact fact or rule VA got wrong, and explain why fixing it would have changed the outcome. The same specificity rule now appears in the Board’s CUE regulation, 38 CFR § 20.1404(b). See Russell v. Principi for the underlying test and 38 CFR § 3.105(a) for the regional office rule.
See it applied: What a CUE request must include →
Find Case →Gladish v. Collins (2025): The Board Can Remand for More Than Duty-to-Assist Errors
What it held: Under the Appeals Modernization Act, the Board’s remand authority under 38 CFR § 20.802(a) is not limited to pre-decisional duty-to-assist errors. The Board may also remand to correct other errors by the regional office, such as notice deficiencies, when doing so has a reasonable possibility of helping substantiate the claim. (The same decision also held that the VA may recoup an overpayment caused by its failure to withhold a representative’s fee.)
Why it matters: If the VA’s decision was flawed in a way other than a missed record or exam, the Board can still send it back for correction — ask for it in your Board appeal.
See it applied: The Board’s remand authority under § 20.802(a) →
Read Opinion →Ortega v. Collins (2026): Only Truly Favorable Findings Bind the VA
What it held: Under 38 U.S.C. § 5104A, only findings that are actually favorable to the veteran bind later VA adjudicators. When a regional office lists a finding as “favorable” that is not favorable, that finding does not bind the VA. The court also held that any error in the Board’s notice about the evidence window was harmless because the veteran never tried to submit evidence, and it reiterated Gladish: the Board can consider remanding under 38 CFR § 20.802(a) for errors other than duty-to-assist errors.
Why it matters: Read the “favorable findings” list in your decision carefully — a mislabeled finding will not protect you. And if a notice error or other non-duty-to-assist problem affected your case, raise it with the Board and cite Gladish and Ortega together when asking for a remand.
See it applied: The Board’s remand authority under § 20.802(a) →
Read Opinion →Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Administration: Earlier Effective Dates for Agent Orange Claims
What it held: A class action by Vietnam veterans and their survivors. In 1989 the court invalidated VA’s 1985 Agent Orange regulation and voided the claim denials made under it. The 1991 settlement (the “Nehmer stipulation”) requires that, when VA adds a disease to the herbicide presumptive list, class members whose claims for that disease were denied or filed earlier can receive an effective date reaching back to the earlier claim, rather than the usual date-of-claim rules. VA carries out these orders in 38 CFR § 3.816.
Why it matters: If you or a deceased Vietnam veteran in your family filed a claim for a condition that was later added to the Agent Orange presumptive list, the back pay may reach much further than the ordinary rules would allow. Ask whether the claim was reviewed under Nehmer, and check the effective date VA assigned.
Read: PACT Act Guide — herbicide presumptives and effective dates →
See it applied: When special rules can support an earlier effective date →
VA manual: M21-1 VIII.i.2.A, VIII.i.2.B →
Find Case →Where to Find Case Law
All CAVC and Federal Circuit decisions are publicly available for free. These are the best sources for researching VA case law.
CAVC — Official Decisions
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims publishes all of its decisions on its official website, searchable by party name, date, and issue. The primary source for binding CAVC precedent.
Search CAVC Decisions →Google Scholar — Case Law
Google Scholar provides free, searchable access to federal court decisions including CAVC and Federal Circuit cases. Search by case name, citation, or legal issue. The fastest way to find and read the full text of a cited case.
Search on Google Scholar →Justia — VA Case Law
Justia provides free access to CAVC decisions with helpful summaries and citation tools. Good for finding cases by topic and for tracing how specific legal standards have evolved over time through subsequent decisions.
Browse CAVC on Justia →Legal Information Institute
Cornell Law School's LII provides annotated access to federal regulations and case law. Particularly useful for reading 38 CFR with cross-references to implementing case law that courts have applied to each section.
38 CFR on Cornell LII →